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Abstract—Campaigns with commercial and spam purposes
have ﬂooded the Twitter community. To understand what scale
of audience a campaign could reach, we ﬁrst perform a measure-
ment study by collecting a dataset of about 10 million tweets via
streaming API and one million search tweets for targeting topics,
as well as 37,313 user accounts that are suspended by Twitter.
From the dataset, we extract a spam campaign and a commercial
promotion campaign accompanied by spamming activities. Then,
we characterize the way in which a campaign can reach its
audience, especially revealing the features that dominate the
information diffusion. After identifying the accounts suspended
by Twitter, we further inspect to what extent these features can
help to weed out spam accounts. Also, the retrospective inspection
is useful to uncover the tactics that malicious accounts utilize to
avoid being suspended. Using the measurement results, we then
develop a theoretical framework based on an epidemic model
to investigate the dynamics of spammers and victims whom
spammers reach in the spam campaign. With the theoretical
framework, we conduct a beneﬁt-cost analysis of the spam
campaign, shedding lights on how to restrict the beneﬁt of the
spam campaign.
I. INTRODUCTION
Twitter provides an economic and fast channel to reach
a large number of users through direct mentions and its
online social networks. Due to the efﬁciency of informa-
tion diffusion, large-scale campaigns ﬂourish in the Twitter
community, including commercial promotion campaign and
spam campaign [1], [2]. As most of campaigns are associated
with spamming activities, campaigns have garnered a great
deal of attention from researchers aiming to improve spam
detection [3], [4], [5]. The previous works identify campaigns
mainly through clustering URLs or calculating similarity of
text. However, it has become more difﬁcult to cluster URLs
correctly due to URL shortening service, and at the meantime,
text can be easily manipulated by spammers. Instead, we resort
to collecting campaign tweets by clustering hashtags associ-
ated to a campaign and searching tweets of these hashtags.
Although a campaign may make use of a collection of hashtags
rather than a single hashtag, we can keep track on the hashtags
of a campaign as long as the campaign is active.
As commercial promotion campaigns tend to be accom-
panied by spamming activities [1], [2], we focus on how
spammers behave in both spam and commercial promotion
campaigns. However, instead of actively detecting spammers
in a campaign based on account behavioral features, we delve
into inspecting the way in which spammers would reach a
wide audience in the campaign, i.e., mention network and
online social network. The mention network is composed of
direct mentions from one account to another in the campaign.
Mention is enabled by adding ‘@username’ in a tweet, and
users who are mentioned will receive a mention notiﬁcation.
The online social network represents follower-following re-
lationships. The investigation on how promotion or malware
diffuse in mention networks and online social networks helps
us to understand the strategy of spammers in the campaign
and ﬁgure out what scale of audience the campaign can reach.
From the perspective of information diffusion, we characterize
diffusion related features (degree, neighborhood connectivity,
and burstiness) in mention networks, as well as degree and
response time in online social networks.
To obtain the insights into detecting spammers with dif-
fusion related features, we identify the accounts that are sus-
pended by Twitter. The information about suspended accounts
enables us to conduct a retrospective inspection on suspended
accounts. In particular, we seek the common diffusion features
of a mention network, which exist among these suspended ac-
count. We observe that the accounts with bursty and distributed
features are more likely to be suspended. This is because
the purpose of spammers in a campaign is to reach as many
accounts as possible. Also, we ﬁnd some spam accounts would
avoid being suspended if they were mentioned frequently by
other accounts. Although the focus of this work is not to design
a speciﬁc algorithm for detecting spam accounts, we believe
that the study of the diffusion features inside a campaign is
critical to develop more advanced detection algorithms and
reveal the tactics that spam accounts utilize to avoid being
suspended.
Upon the inspection of mention networks and online social
networks inside the Twitter, we further develop a theoretical
framework based on an epidemic model to analyze the dy-
namics of spammers and audience whom spammers reach. The
theoretical framework in turn enables us to quantify the beneﬁt
and cost of spammers when they launch a campaign. We deﬁne
the beneﬁt of a campaign as the audience that it reaches, since
in essence, the goal of a campaign is to reach as many accounts
as possible within a certain period. Meanwhile, the cost is the
price that a campaign has to pay for reaching a wide audience,
including bursty activity and suspended accounts. Based on the
measurement results, we conduct the beneﬁt-cost analysis for
a campaign by using the theoretical framework. We further
highlight the factor that determines the variation of the ratio
between beneﬁt and cost in a speciﬁc scenario. Therefore,
the beneﬁt-cost analysis of a campaign will shed lights on
understanding the strategy of spammers and how to thwart the
campaign.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
present the background in Section II. We describe the dataset
in Section III and provide an overview of campaigns mined
from the dataset in Section IV. In Section V, we characterize
mention networks and online social networks to explore what
scale of audience a campaign could reach. Section VI presents
the theoretical framework developed from an epidemic model
and the beneﬁt-cost analysis of a spam campaign based on the
theoretical framework. Section VII surveys related work, and
ﬁnally we conclude this paper in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Information Propagation in Twitter
In general, information propagation in Twitter is mainly
through direct mentions and online social networks.
The online social network represents the follower-friend
relationship in Twitter. A tweet published by an account will
be presented at the personal timeline of all the followers of
this account. Each account has different inﬂuence, in terms
of information diffusion. The inﬂuence is mainly measured by
the number of followers. Content promoters and spammers are
eager for building a functional network of followers to promote
content or distribute spam. Aiming at this goal, on one hand,
they could buy followers from Twitter account market [5].
Agents running the account business collect a large number
of accounts by creating new accounts and obtaining accounts
from those customers who are willing to use the service with
no charge but at the cost of releasing their credentials. On
the other hand, they could also compromise the inﬂuential
accounts.
Mention is a diffusion method independent of online social
network. A tweet with mentions to other accounts will also
be presented at their personal timelines. Mention provides
a convenient way for normal accounts to communicate with
each other, but at the same time, spammers can reach an
enormous number of accounts beyond the boundary of their
social networks by sending unsolicited messages.
B. Campaigns in Twitter
Campaigns are always launched in Twitter to promote con-
tent. A large number of accounts are involved in a campaign
to publish tweets, such that the campaign can remain active
throughout a period of time. The campaigns could be executed
by central controllers orchestrating thousands of accounts, or
exhibit a globally decentralized way that is always supported
by spam-as-a-service programs [2]. In general, a campaign is
bound to a collection of URLs and hashtags.
III. DATASET
We collect about 10 million sample tweets and over one
million search tweets sent by 458,746 users within a 21-day
window. Firstly, we collect the sample data via Streaming
API in Twitter. Then, we extract the hashtags appearing in
sample data and rank the frequency each 30 minutes. We
record 15 most frequent hashtags, called sample hot topics.
We search tweets of these 15 most frequent hashtags (sample
hot topics) via search API in multiple machines during the
next 30 minutes. These search tweets are used to mine the
campaigns from topic connection. We obtain the online social
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Fig. 1: Data collection method.
network via Twitter API, and extract mention, retweet and
URL information from each search tweet to obtain the implicit
diffusion networks. Furthermore, we check users’ timeline two
months later to identify if an account is suspended by Twitter.
By doing this, we ﬁnd 37,313 accounts that are suspended by
Twitter. The data collection method is illustrated in Fig. 1.
IV. CAMPAIGNS IN SAMPLE DATA
In this section, we mine the campaigns from sample hot
topics we collect. Campaigns tend to produce and promote a
collection of hashtags. We can trace the hashtags of a campaign
when the campaign is active. By aggregating the hashtags of
a campaign, we can mine the campaign. We then describe the
campaigns.
A. Mining Campaigns from Sample Hot Topics
We mine the campaigns from sample hot topics. We build
an undirected graph G =< V;E > to represent the relationship
among sample hot topics. In this graph, we consider each
sample hot topic as a node. There is an undirected edge
between two sample hot topics, if they appear in the same
tweet. By doing this, we obtain two largest components in
the graph, which respectively belong to two campaigns. The
largest one includes 36 sample hot topics, while the second
includes seven sample hot topics. Literally, all hashtags (e.g.,
“TeamFollowback” and “Followback”) in the largest compo-
nent ask people to “follow back”, while the second appears for
“game promotion”. Therefore, we name the two campaigns as
“follow back” and “game promotion”.
B. Campaigns
1) “Follow Back”: We show the relationship of hashtags
involved in “follow back” in Fig. 2a. We collect a total of
389,063 tweets about “follow back”, in which 7.3% of tweets
contain URLs and 26.9% of tweets contain mentions. Through
manually checking these URLs, we ﬁnd that they direct to
irrelevant news webpages, webpages in Twitter blacklist and
the timeline of some accounts, which are usually suspended.
Moreover, the reason why these URLs direct to irrelevant
news webpages is that the news tweet is hijacked to re-
publish together with certain hashtags. For example, a tweet
“(a) #TeamFollowBack #FF @Kaijzer (b) The AgePassengers
—pay price— for rescuing French sailor at seaThe AgeCruise
ship M... http://t.co/pEIbTPkT” is composed of (a) promoted3
hashtags and (b) a news tweet. Within the URLs, 6.8% of them
are suspended by Twitter.
“Follow back” campaign complies with the characteristics
of a spam campaign, such as directing users to spamming
URLs and sending a number of unsolicited messages. The
purpose of this campaign is to allure numerous accounts to visit
the webpages for exchanging followers or buying followers.
Different from legitimate promotion campaigns, they redirect
legitimate accounts to underground services (e.g., exchanging
followers), which is costly and risky to develop. It results in
a considerably low proportion of URLs in the campaign. The
campaign mainly depends on mentioning an enormous number
of accounts to enlarge the reach and maximize the inﬂuence.
(a) “Follow back” (b) “game promotion”
Fig. 2: Relationship of hashtags in “follow back” and “game
promotion”
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Fig. 3: Dynamics of “follow back” and “game promotion”.
2) “Game Promotion”: We also illustrate the relationship
of hashtags involved in “game promotion” in Fig. 2b. There are
seven hashtags in “game promotion”. Three of them (“ipad”,
“10TurnOns”, and “android”) are trending topics, while the
others are all for promoting games. We collect a total of 74,452
tweets, in which 78.7% of tweets contain URLs and only 1.6%
of them contain mentions. We ﬁnd that most URLs direct
to the webpages for downloading games or online games.
“Game promotion” is a campaign for commercial promotion. It
depends on manipulating trending topics to increase exposure
to other accounts and eventually gain beneﬁt. Only 0.08% of
URLs published in “game promotion” are in the blacklist of
Twitter. The dynamics of both campaigns are shown in Fig. 3.
There is an interesting observation that these two cam-
paigns are executed in different ways. “Follow back” empha-
sizes on mentioning a large number of other accounts, but does
not post much URLs. “Game promotion” is the opposite, which
publishes URLs about products as frequently as possible, but
rarely mentions accounts. Moreover, we ﬁnd the different
diurnal sending patterns of these two campaigns. “Follow
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Fig. 4: Diurnal sending pattern of ”follow back” and ”game
promotion.”
back” is active from 4am to 5pm, while “game promotion”
is active from 4pm to 8pm, as shown in Fig. 4. Nevertheless,
although “game promotion” is a commercial promotion cam-
paign, we ﬁnd there are a signiﬁcant number of accounts in that
“game promotion” campaign are suspended later. At the same
time, “game promotion” campaign hijacks trending topics to
enlarge the scale of audience whom it reaches. Therefore,
“game promotion” employs spamming tactics in despite of its
commercial promotion goal.
V. EXPLORING MENTION NETWORK AND ONLINE
SOCIAL NETWORK
In this section, we characterize mention network and online
social network to explore what scale of audience a campaign
could reach. Speciﬁcally, what scale of audience a campaign
could reach through its mention network is determined by
outdegree and burstiness of each account; when it comes to its
online social network, the number of followers and response
time for propagating a content determine the scale of audience
that a campaign could reach.
A. Mention Network Analysis
To understand how efﬁciently a mention network can reach
audience, we investigate the following network characteristics:
outdegree and indegree, neighborhood connectivity, and ac-
counts’ burstiness. Moreover, with the knowledge of which
accounts are suspended by Twitter, we inspect the activity of
spammers and gain insights into detecting spammers from the
features we study in mention networks.
1) Outdegree and Indegree: Outdegree measures the fre-
quency that an account mentions others, while indegree mea-
sures the frequency that an account is mentioned. The out-
degree and indegree of accounts are shown in Fig. 5. We
observe that: (1) For both campaigns, there exist accounts with
extremely large outdegree and indegree. The larger outdegree
an account has, the more audience it reaches. Meanwhile, large
indegree could serve as a camouﬂage for spammers, since an
account that is mentioned more frequently is more likely to
be viewed as legitimate. (2) Most accounts that are mentioned
have low indegree values. It implies that campaigns aim to
reach as many accounts as possible rather than focusing on
speciﬁc target accounts. From the modeling prospective, the
distribution of outdegree in both campaigns can be approx-
imated as Pareto distribution, since most of mentions come
from a rather small portion of accounts.
Relationship with Suspended Accounts. We also inspect4
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Fig. 5: Outdegree and Indegree.
the relationship between outdegree and account suspension.
Outdegree reﬂects the amount of audience one account can
reach. We rank the accounts by outdegree and inspect about
top 5% accounts (with outdegree larger than 10). For “follow
back” campaign, we check the accounts with outdegree larger
than 10. They are in total of 1,291, of which 584 have
been suspended by Twitter. However, for “game promotion”
campaign, none of 40 accounts with outdegree higher than 10
are suspended by Twitter. Note that the number of accounts
being suspended increases as time passes, since potential
spammers would be detected.
2) Neighborhood connectivity: In network analysis, the
neighborhood connectivity of a node is deﬁned as the average
connectivity of all neighbors of this node. Here, the neigh-
borhood connectivity of an account is referred to the average
outdegree of all accounts that are mentioned by this account.
Measuring this metric is to reveal the hierarchical structure of
a mention network.
Fig. 6 depicts the neighborhood connectivity of “follow
back” and “game promotion”. Note that Fig. 6a is plotted
in log-log. Compared with “game promotion”, “follow back”
campaign has accounts with neighborhood connectivity less
than 0:1 in zone I. These accounts connect to a large number
of accounts without mentioning others. And also, there are
accounts with neighborhood connectivity larger than 10 in
zone II. Notice that we obtain the speciﬁc values (0.1 and 10)
by ranking neighborhood connectivity and choosing about 5%
accounts with the largest and lowest neighborhood connectiv-
ities, respectively. Their neighbors mention others frequently.
We can see about 90% of accounts in zone I are mentioned
by accounts in zone II at the early stage. This suggests that
the accounts in zone I can be regarded as the executors of
the campaign, while the accounts in zone II can be considered
as the controllers. Meanwhile, executors further mention the
target accounts that do not mention any accounts at all. In
other words, there exists a hierarchical structure in the mention
network: controllers are on the top and connect to executors,
who turn out to reach as many accounts as possible. This
implication could be evaluated by inspecting the suspended
accounts in zones I and II. In Fig. 5, we can see that both
campaigns have accounts with high outdegree. Therefore, there
exist executors mentioning a number of target accounts in
both campaigns. However, compared with ”game promotion”
campaign, ”follow back” campaign exhibits evident clue of
centralized control of mentions.
Relationship with Suspended Accounts. We inspect if ac-
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Fig. 6: Neighborhood connectivity.
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Fig. 7: Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of burstiness
for “follow back” and “game promotion”. Inset is the cu-
mulative distribution function of outdegree for accounts with
burstiness of  1.
counts classiﬁed as executors and controllers of “follow back”
are suspended by Twitter. We observe that 581 out of 1,276
executors and 30 out of 200 controllers are suspended by
Twitter, respectively. Clearly, executors are suspended more
frequently than controllers, due to intensive activity. However,
most of suspended accounts in “game promotion” have zero
neighborhood connectivity. Therefore, neighborhood connec-
tivity should not be applied as an indicator of detecting
spammers for “game promotion”, since its mention network
has no clear hierarchical structure.
3) Burstiness: Burstiness is the degree of the bursty ac-
tivities. Burst means intensive activities in a short period of
time [6]. This temporal feature plays a critical role in the
information diffusion process during a period of time.
We measure the burstiness of an account as
Burstiness(u) =
std(intervalu)   mean(intervalu)
std(intervalu) + mean(intervalu)
; (1)
where intervalu represents time intervals of account u men-
tioning others. Fig. 7 shows the cumulative distribution func-
tion of burstiness for “follow back” and “game promotion”. It
is observed that nearly 60% of accounts in “follow back” and
87% in “game promotion” have the value of burstiness being
 1. However, when we further investigate these accounts, we
can see that about 95% of them only mention others twice.
Almost all the remainder of accounts in both campaigns have
positive burstiness values. In other words, most of accounts
exhibit positive burstiness except accounts that only have few
mentions.
Relationship with Suspended Accounts. Intuitively, spam-
mers would be more bursty than legitimate accounts so as to5
reach more target accounts in a short period of time. We rank
the accounts by burtiness and obtain about top 5% accounts
with the largest burstiness. We inspect those accounts with
burstiness larger than 0:4 in both campaigns. We observe 363
out of 869 accounts in “follow back” are suspended, while
none of 40 accounts in “game promotion” is suspended.
4) Implication into Spammer Detection: We ﬁrst inspect
the suspended accounts and illustrate which features they
exhibit. Afterwards, we further examine the sample accounts
randomly chosen from the suspect accounts.
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Fig. 8: Relationship between suspended accounts and features
of the mention network.
We inspect the accounts exhibiting at least one of the
following features: (a) outdegree > 10, (b) burstiness > 0:4,
and (c) classiﬁed as controller or executor. For each feature,
we show how many accounts are suspended in Fig. 8. For
“follow back” campaign, we observe that
 Mention outdegree and burstiness could indicate
whether an account will be suspended to a extent, al-
though they may not be employed to detect malicious
accounts directly.
 However, mention outdegree and burstiness fail to in-
dicate those accounts that are classiﬁed as controllers.
With a closer look into these controllers, we ﬁnd
that they likely avoid being suspended through being
mentioned frequently by other accounts.
For “game promotion” campaign, no accounts with outde-
gree > 10 or burstiness > 0:4 are suspended. The possible
explanation is that there are only a few tweets in “game
promotion” campaign which contain mentions.
To verify the implications, we inspect the behavior of
these highly suspected but still active accounts. To do this,
we collect their continuous tweets of one week by using
ﬁlter of Streaming API. Fig. 9 shows publishing intervals of
two sample accounts. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst sample account is
an account we classify as controller in “follow back” with
outdegree > 10 and burstiness > 0:4, the second account
is an account we classify as executor in “follow back” with
outdegree > 10 and burstiness > 0:4. It is observed that both
accounts exhibit cyclic behavior to some extent. However, the
cyclic intervals are mixed with random intervals, i.e., their
behaviors manifest both human and bot features. This is one
reason why they avoid being suspended. We also click the
URLs they published and observe some of them are the same
as those of the suspended accounts.
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Fig. 9: Two samples of accounts that are highly suspected but
still active.
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Fig. 10: Follower number and friend number of both cam-
paigns. The red solid line represents “follow back”, while the
blue dashed line is “game promotion”.
B. Online Social Network Analysis
Online social network is one of the most important part
of social media, through which most of information ﬂows.
To explore what scale of audience a campaign could reach
through its online social network, we proceed with analyzing
accounts’ friend-follower relationship and response time of the
two campaigns.
Recall that the mention network we study above is not
related to speciﬁc content. However, the online social network
we study corresponds to some speciﬁc contents, e.g., URLs.
1) Followers and Friends: A tweet from an account is
broadcast to all of its followers. Similarly, an account would
receive all tweets posted by its friends. We say, account A is
account B’s follower and account B is A’s friend, if account
A follows account B. We investigate the follower and friend
distribution of accounts involved in “follow back” and “game
promotion” campaigns, respectively. Fig. 10 shows both the
follower number and the friend number. The red solid line
represents “follow back”, while the blue dashed line is “game
promotion”. We ﬁnd that they are similar to each other, except
that there are more accounts in “follow back” without follower
and friend than “game promotion”.
The online social network we focus on is a dynamic net-
work, which consists of the accounts that propagate some spe-
ciﬁc contents. The online social network can also be regarded
as a functional network for diffusing contents. Consequently,
two campaigns construct similar functional networks for dif-
fusing contents, in contrary to different mention networks.
2) Response time: Response time is the interval between
the time a tweet is posted and the time it is retweeted or replied.
Obviously, response time determines the diffusion speed of a
piece of content through the online social network. Here, we
analyze the response time sequence for the contents propagated6
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Fig. 11: (a), (b) and (c) are three typical response time patterns.
(d) shows goodness of linear ﬁt (R2) (the red square) and
burstiness of response time sequence ( the blue circle). The
y-axis represents the value of goodness of ﬁt and burstiness.
in both campaigns. The response time sequence is a series of
intervals when a piece of content diffuses through the online
social network. Note that response time is a feature of the
content rather than a certain account.
We trace the response time sequence of a piece of content
being diffused by using ﬁlter of Streaming API. We ﬁrst cluster
the retweets of the same URLs together. All tweets contain
“RT@ user: ”. Tweets in each cluster have the same URL. We
use URLs to represent the content.
We observe three typical response time sequences of URL
diffusion, as illustrated in Fig. 11. Fig. 11a shows the linear
relationship between response time and retweet number, while
Fig. 11b exhibits the staircase feature, i.e., a series of bursty
retweets follow a long interval. The former could be well ﬁt
by a line and has regular response intervals, while the latter
could not be ﬁt by a line but has bursty response intervals.
Fig. 11c shows the third response time pattern and its shape
is between the above two kinds.
We investigate the URLs in our dataset which are retweeted
more than 100 times . We use two metrics corresponding to
the two typical response time distributions mentioned above:
goodness of ﬁt (R2) of linear ﬁt, and burstiness (deﬁned in
Section V-A) of response time sequence. Fig. 11d shows the
result of 30 URLs. We can see that URLs from 1st to 8th are
retweeted with the response time sequence like Fig. 11b shows,
and URLs from 28th to 30th are retweeted with the response
time sequence like Fig. 11a shows. The remainder is retweeted
with the response time sequence like Fig. 11c shows.
In addition, we would like to ﬁgure out the difference be-
tween response time sequence and response time distribution.
The latter neglects temporal order of the sequence. We can see
that, the response time distributions of most topics are close
to power-law distribution, which complies with the existing
results. However, they exhibit clearly different response time
sequence patterns, implying the distinct strategies in different
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Fig. 12: Cascade depth of the mention network and online
social network.
campaigns.
C. Comparison of Information Cascades in Two Networks
We further compare the efﬁciency of information diffusion
between the mention network and the online social network.
The metric we consider here is the depth of information
cascade. Cascade depth has been used to identify the inﬂuence
of accounts and content in Twitter [10].
We inspect the cascade depth of a speciﬁc topic propagated
through the mention network and the online social network.
Without loss of generality, we randomly choose a hashtag
“teamfollowback”. We show the cascade depths of the mention
network and the online social network in Fig. 12. The cascades
we inspect in the mention network are mention cascades,
while the cascades we inspect in the online social network
are retweet cascades. We observe that the mention network
and the online social network have similar cascade depth
distribution. Speciﬁcally, the cascade depth in both networks
is approximately power-law, implying that the vast majority
of cascades end up with being spread only few times. The
largest cascade depths of the mention network and the online
social network are six and seven, respectively. It indicates that
mention networks play a non-negligible role in information
diffusion.
VI. SPAM BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
Upon characterizing the diffusion network of campaigns
launched in Twitter, we proceed to conducting the beneﬁt-cost
analysis of spammers who launch the campaigns. Intuitively,
spammers are eager to reach as many accounts as possible
within a period, however, acting aggressively may lead to being
suspended by Twitter. In this section, we present a theoretical
analysis on the relationship between the number of accounts
that spammers reach in a campaign and the price spammers
have to pay, including spam accounts that are suspended and
bursty activity for reaching audience.
Note that the objective of our theoretical framework is not
to predict the scale of audience a campaign could reach but
to explain the ecosystem behind the campaign. Our theoretical
framework is based on the measurement results and quantify
the beneﬁt and cost of spammers who launch the campaign. We
will present the deﬁnition of beneﬁt and cost for a campaign
later on.7
A. Modeling Dynamics of Spammers and Audience with De-
terministic SIS Model
Spammers of a campaign propagate the malicious infor-
mation to both their followers and accounts they actively
mention. This process is similar to the spread of disease. In
this respect, we call the spammers and accounts reached by
them as infectious and susceptible accounts, respectively. Let
i(t) and s(t) denote the number of infectious and susceptible
accounts at time t, respectively. The susceptible accounts can
become infectious accounts (i.e., spammers) with transition
rate . Spammers are suspended at rate  (i.e., the infectious
accounts die at rate ). Moreover,
 New spammers 1 are continuously added to maintain
the magnitude of spammers involved in the campaign.
Let L(t) denote the number of new spammers added
at time t.
 The infectious accounts (spammers) reach audience
through online social networks and direct mentions,
who thus become susceptible accounts. Let f(t) and
m(t) denote the average number of accounts that
a spammer reaches at time t through online social
networks and direct mentions, respectively. The rate
at which new susceptible accounts are produced can
be expressed as i(t)(f(t) + m(t)) at time t.
 The susceptible accounts fade away after a certain
period of time, which can be expressed as: D(t) = P
S dj(t). Therein, dj(t) represents the probability of
jth susceptible accounts fading away at time t and S
denotes the set of susceptible accounts.
Consequently, the differential equations describing the dy-
namics of susceptible accounts (audience reached by spam-
mers) and infectious accounts (spammers) based on the pro-
ceeding assumptions have the following form:

ds
dt =  s(t) + i(t)(f(t) + m(t))   D(t)
di
dt = s(t) + L(t)   i(t)
(2)
It is worth to note that the population n (n = s + i) may
not be constant. The differential equation of the population n
is given by
dn
dt
= i(t)(f(t) + m(t))   D(t) + L(t)   i(t) (3)
We ﬁrst study the scenario that the population n remains
constant (i.e., dn
dt = 0). In this respect, we can study the
equilibria of the dynamics of spammers and audience whom
spammers reach. Let

ds
dt = 0 =  s(t) + i(t)(f(t) + m(t))   D(t)
di
dt = 0 = s(t) + L(t)   i(t)
(4)
There are two solutions to the equilibria; one is (s = n;i =
0), which makes no sense in this case. The other solution is
(s = 1

D L(f+m)
f+m ) ;i = D L
f+m ). For simplicity, we omit the
time t in each function. We observe that i is independent on
. It means, a spam campaign has to continuously invest new
spammers in order to maintain sufﬁcient spammers involved
in the campaign and therefore keep the campaign active.
1Here a spammer means a spam account. In other word, spammer is
interchangeable with spam account in this analysis.
B. Beneﬁt-cost Analysis
Before we delve into the beneﬁt-cost analysis, we would
introduce an important factor , which indicates the average
activity level of spammers. Besides the strategy of investing
new spammers, i.e., L(t), which is mentioned above, the
activity level represents the activity strategy of spammers.
Moreover, the activity level  is closely related to , f and m.
In this respect, , f and m can be regarded as the functions
of , expressed as f(;t), m(;t) and (;t).
The purpose of spammers is to reach as many accounts as
possible within a speciﬁc duration. Here, we deﬁne the beneﬁt
of spammers as the population increment rate max(dn
dt ), where
n represents the number of entire accounts involved in the
campaign. At the same time, to achieve this purpose, spammers
have to remain active in a certain level to reach audience
and take the risk of being suspended by Twitter. The more
active spammers are, the higher risk they take. Consequently,
we deﬁne the cost of spammers as the sum of the total
activity of spammers and the spammers who are suspended,
i.e., 
R
L(t)dt +
R
(;t)dt.
Let E denote the ratio of beneﬁt and cost. E can be
represented as the following equation:
E =
dn
dt   0

R
L(t)dt +
R
(;t)dt
(5)
=
i(t)(f(;t) + m(;t))   D(t) + L(t)   (;t)i(t)

R
L(t)dt +
R
(;t)dt
(6)
where we measure the beneﬁt as dn
dt   0. Note when  ! 0
( > 0 ), we let E = 0. Since when spammers only
perform little activity with very small cost, they should obtain
little beneﬁt. By clarifying that, we can further study the
characteristic of @E
@. To this end, we ﬁrst have to specify the
function f(;t);m(;t) and (;t). Since activity level ()
is the function of time t, we could omit t from function @E
@
when we consider the impact of activity level () on E.
Based on the measurement results in Section V, we can
obtain the detailed function forms of f(), m() and () for
a speciﬁc topic. Fig. 13 shows a sample of f();m() and
(). In the sample, f();m() and () all exhibit clearly
linear relationship with . However, it is worth noting that they
may exhibit different function forms for distinct strategies that
spammers employ.
However, L(t) and D(t) could not be obtained directly
from the measurements. L(t) is determined by the strategies
of spammers. In [2], L(t) in ﬁve campaigns are illustrated.
Take an example, the strategy of a campaign may exhibit
in the way that spammers are registered in bulks before the
onset of the campaign and activated in a rolling fashion
within the window of spam broadcasting. Meanwhile, D(t)
is well beyond subjective strategy or tactic, which represents
the effective duration of susceptible accounts.
Without loss of generality, we would utilize the theoretical
framework to study @E
@ in a speciﬁc scenario where we
assume: (1) f()  kf, m()  km, and ()  k,
(kf;km;k 2 R); (2) L(t) is periodic (rolling fashion) and
hence
R
L(t)dt  L0T=t0, where t0 is the period, T is
the total length of time, and L0 denotes the number of8
0 50 100 150
0
1
2
3
4x 10
4
f
(
α
)
α
(a) f() vs. 
0 1000 2000 3000
0
500
1000
1500
2000
m
(
α
)
α
(b) m() vs. 
0 50 100 150
0
10
20
30
40
µ
(
α
)
α
(c) () vs. 
Fig. 13: A sample of functions f(), m() and ().
spammers invested within a period. Through calculating the
partial derivative of Eq. 6, @E
@ is given by
@E
@
=
(D(t)   L(t))(
R
L(t)dt +
R
(;t)dt)
(
R
L(t)dt +
R
(;t)dt)2 : (7)
Since 
R
L(t)dt+
R
(;t)dt > 0 holds, @E
@ > 0 holds when
(D(t) L(t)) > 0, while @E
@ < 0 holds when (D(t) L(t)) <
0. It indicates that (D(t) L(t)) determines the variation of the
ratio of beneﬁt and cost for spammers in the speciﬁc scenario
above.
Recall that D(t) is the effective duration of susceptible
accounts. Obviously, spammers can hardly handle this ob-
jective factor. In this respect, the ratio of beneﬁt and cost
drops when the spammers invested into the campaign is more
than the susceptible accounts that are no longer affected
by spammers. It is also worth noting that various function
forms of f(;t), m(;t), (;t) and L(t) can be taken into
consideration besides the speciﬁc scenario we consider above,
which guarantees the generality of this theoretical framework.
C. Evaluation of beneﬁt-cost analysis
We conclude from the beneﬁt-cost analysis that the vari-
ation of the ratio of beneﬁt and cost is determined by
D(t) L(t) rather than activity. To verify this, we ﬁrst calculate
the ratio of beneﬁt and cost of two spam topics (“TeamFol-
lowback” and “TFBJP”). According to Eq .6, we inspect the
amount of audience who are reached, activity, and the number
of accounts that are suspended. Nonetheless, we cannot access
to the number of accounts that are suspended at time t, but
only the number of suspended accounts that are still active
at time t, denoted by SN(t). Since most suspended accounts
only perform action once in our dataset, it is reasonable to
approximate the number of suspended accounts at time t with
SN(t). Activity measures the average activity level at time
t, which is averaged over the number of suspended accounts
at time t. The ratio of beneﬁt and cost against time for two
topics is illustrated in Fig. 14. Afterwards, we investigate the
relationship between activity and the ratio of beneﬁt and cost.
As Fig. 15 depicted, it is evident that there is no correlation
between activity and the ratio of beneﬁt and cost for both spam
topics, which complies with the ﬁndings we derived from the
beneﬁt-cost analysis.
However, it is difﬁcult to directly verify that D(t)   L(t)
dominates the variation of the ratio of beneﬁt and cost, because
of no direct access to D(t) and L(t). Consequently, a feasible
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Fig. 15: Ratio of beneﬁt and cost vs. Activity.
solution is to infer D(t) and L(t). Note that the number of
suspended accounts that are still active at time t (SN(t)) is
related to L(t) and D(t), which could be used to infer D(t)
and L(t). But the detailed inference remains as the future work.
D. Limitation of Beneﬁt-cost Analysis
First, we only discuss a speciﬁc scenario that m(), f()
and () are linearly related to . Second, we do not study
the impact of D(t) and L(t) on the variation of the ratio of
beneﬁt and cost, due to the lack of direct access to D(t) and
L(t). However, we leave the inference of D(t) and L(t) as
our future work.
VII. RELATED WORK
A. Spam Analysis
Spam detection in Twitter has attracted broad attention.
Thomas et al. [2] characterized the behavior of spam accounts9
and connections among them, and identiﬁed spam campaigns
based on the URLs in tweets. Grier et al. [4] detected spams
using URL blacklist, and found that a majority of spammers
are compromised accounts. In [11], Yang et al. studied the
social relationships among Twitter spammers. Egele et al. [12]
endeavored to detect compromised accounts by building users’
behavior proﬁles using their posting features. Benevenuto et al.
[13] traversed almost all Twitter users and collected a signiﬁ-
cant number of tweets; and they manually detected spammers
and identiﬁed some common features of spammers. Wang et
al. [14] proposed and evaluated a set of connection-based and
tweet-based features for spammer detection. In [15][16], the
authors set up social honey-pots to harvest spammers, and then
built spammer classiﬁers based on spam proﬁles. Song et al.
[17] utilized connection information to detect spam in real-
time. Gao et al. [3] proposed an online spam system which
ﬁrstly clusters tweets then detects spam clusters using spammer
and spam-content features. Lee et al. [18] proposed a spam
detection system called Warningbird by utilizing correlated
redirect chains of URLs. Xie et al. [19] focused on associating
legitimate users via vouching, instead of directly detecting
malicious accounts. Stringhini et al. [5] investigated the service
of buying-follower in the underground market.
B. Information Diffusion in Twitter
Meanwhile, many existing works devote to studying infor-
mation propagation in Twitter. Cha et al. [20] studied users’
inﬂuence dynamics over topics and time using three inﬂuence
measures. Yang et al. [21] used a regression model to measure
the ability of user interation features on predicting topic
propagation. They found that compared to social relationships,
user interaction features work better in analyzing information
diffusion. Suh et al. [22] examined what factors might affect
retweetability of tweets, which determines how widely a tweet
can be spread. Wu et al. [23] classiﬁed Twitter users into
different groups and studied how information diffused inner-
group and inter-group. Wang et al. [24] proposed a recommen-
dation scheme by employing mention to expand the diffusion
of tweets.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To explore what scale of audience a campaign could reach
through its mention network and online social network, we
investigate degree, neighborhood connectivity, and burstiness
of mention networks, as well as degree and response time
of online social networks for two campaigns, “follow back”
and “game promotion”. “Follow back” is clearly a spam
campaign due to numerous unsolicited mentions, while “game
promotion” is a commercial promotion campaign but resorts
to spamming activity. The inspection of mention networks
and online social networks helps us to reveal the tactics for
a campaign to maximize the spread. Moreover, we identify
suspended accounts and inspect their diffusion related features
in retrospect, which sheds light on developing more advanced
spammer detection algorithms.
Based on the measurements of mention networks and
online social networks, we conduct a beneﬁt-cost analysis on
the spam campaign. The analysis is based on the theoretical
framework developed from epidemic model. We consider a
speciﬁc scenario: the number of spammers who are suspended
and the number of accounts that spammers reach are linearly
related to spammers’ activity, and new spammers are invested
into the campaign in a rolling fashion. In this respect, we high-
light the factor that dominates the variation of ratio between
beneﬁt and cost in a campaign.
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